Strategy. However, the United States' international drug policies have not been able to produce evidence of success. Despite unprecedented coordination and involvement by the U.S. military, federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, the amount of illegal drugs being smuggled across our borders has continued to increase. New measures adopted by the international community have failed to stem the dramatic worldwide increase in the production of opium, marijuana and coca. 1 Compounding this problem is the rise and popularity of drug use among America's youth driven by a steady disinclination to acknowledge the risks and harm of drug use.2
The economics of the illicit drug industry, combined with a lack of international cooperation, have been the root causes of the failure of the U.S. international drug control strategy. Our international policies are weighted heavily on the supply side tactics of eradication and interdiction and have had little impact on the flow of drugs into the United States; nor have they had much impact on reducing drug abuse in this country.
A historical review clearly indicates that the ways and means of our National Drug
Control Strategy need to be adjusted.
This study will explain why our international drug control strategy has been unsuccessful by focusing on some of the underlying economic, social and political aspects of the illicit cocaine drug trade and how they impact the United States counterdrug strategies of eradication and interdiction in the Latin American source countries of Bolivia and Peru.
SOURCE COUNTRY POLICIES
In general, source country policies are designed to accomplish one of three goals:
create scarcity by preventing the movement and sale of drugs, prevent production by destroying the inputs to production and provide economic alternatives to lure people away from the business of cultivation, production and drug trafficking.3 Interdiction, eradication, and development assistance have been used to achieve these objectives. The ultimate goal of the source country strategy is to drive up the retail price of the illegal drug so that people will consume less, that is, to reduce the supply of drugs available to U.S. users.
A MATTER OF ECONOMICS
Throughout the last two decades the United States has largely ignored the socioeconomic impact of the illicit drug industry. We focused instead on a strategy that was weighted heavily on supply related solutions. The economics and social structure of the drug trade vitiate the source country supply side solutions of eradication and interdiction.
The price structure of the drug market severely limits the potential impact of interdiction and eradication. American taxpayers have spent about $30 billion a year on domestic and international drug control. 4 Latin America, the price of cocaine in U.S. cities would increase by less than 5 percent. 8 The amount of capital poured into the illicit drug industry is staggering. In 1993
Americans spent an estimated 49 billion on illegal drugs: 31 billion on cocaine, 7 billion on heroin, 9 billion on marijuana and 2 billion on other illegal drugs.
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The increased demand for cocaine has been the market catalyst. Even though there is indication that the number of new cocaine users is slowly declining, more people use cocaine than a decade ago, and individual consumption rates are higher. In 1972 total annual U.S. cocaine consumption was less than 50 metric tons as compared to 1992, when U.S. annual consumption increased to approximately 300 metric tons. 10 Helping fuel the demand and sustain the Latin American cocaine industry is the international appetite for illicit drugs. The United States consumes a relatively small portion of worldwide drug production. The U.S. cocaine consumption is less than onethird of total global production with our heroin habit less than 4 per cent of worldwide production. 11
The production of coca in Latin American countries is inextricably linked to long- The Peruvian state policy caused the large corporate farms to displace some important Andean food crops in urban areas. Peasant-grown potatoes dropped from 46 percent to 11 percent of the total share of the urban markets. 19 The dire economic conditions in Peru caused a migration of peasants and other victims of failed industries toward the profits of coca farming, production and trafficking in the Upper Huallaga
Valley. By 1990, some 700,000 or 5 percent of the Peruvian workforce participated in the coca-cocaine industry.
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The Bolivian government has favored the financing of commercial agriculture in the lowland Santa Cruz region. Since the 1950's, credit, exchange rate, investment, pricing, agricultural research and export policies have supported the Santa Cruz agricultural elites. These policies, unfavorable to peasant agriculture, combined with the poverty in Bolivia, caused a major migration of peasant farmers to the Chapare region which is the country's primary coca growing area. By 1990 approximately 250,000 or 7 percent of the work force were involved in the cocaine industry.
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Peasants of both Bolivia and Peru quickly discovered the advantages of coca growing. Using Bolivia as an example: at the peak of the coca trade in the early 1980's, the average farmer in the Chapare could expect at least $5,000 a year from growing coca as compared to $500 a year from the second most profitable crop in the Chapare at that time: citrus fruit. 23 Even when coca prices were at an all time low in late 1989 and early 1990, the average coca farm was still earning between $816 and $2,940 a year.24
Other advantages of coca are that it is relatively easy to grow, it has a high yield and it requires very little overhead to cultivate and harvest. It flourishes on steep slopes, in infertile acidic soils, and in conditions that restrict the growth of other crops. A farmer can expect to have some sort of income within twelve months of planting coca, full production after two to three years, and an average plant lifespan of fifteen years. Coca gives four crops a year, requires less attention and investment than other crops once it has been planted, and requires only manual labor to pick. It is also easy to pack and transport, not requiring a well developed transportation infrastructure, which many of the coca growing regions lack. It can provide ready and guaranteed liquidity into cash virtually at any time of the year.
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In contrast are the difficulties associated with the production and sale of other common crops. Rice, citrus fruits, bananas, and papaya all suffer from quick spoilage and the absence of a good infrastructure to get them quickly to market. For papaya, a farmer is lucky to achieve a profit of $50 after six months of labor. In 1990 a truckload of oranges fetched around $75 in La Paz, roughly the same as the cost to transport them there. A 1990 USAID study indicated that only macadamia nuts and rubber would have given a farmer greater income than coca that year. However, there is a wait of seven and ten years respectively before these commodities are ready for commercial production. 
ERADICATION
Most drug producing crops, especially coca, can be grown very cheaply almost anywhere. Only a very small portion of potential growing area is currently being used in Peru and Bolivia. Combined, Bolivia and Peru cover more than 900,000 square miles of 28 territory. Of this, coca farming occupies only 900 square miles. To manually eradicate the relatively small areas that are under cultivation would take considerable manpower:
10,000 people working full-time can eradicate about 400 square miles a year. Given the remote territory where most of the coca is cultivated, transportation and sustainment of such a labor force would be extremely difficult. In addition, eradication efforts require a substantial defense force to protect laborers from the often violent reprisals of drug cartels, guerrillas and the local populace. The Sendero Luminoso's (Shining Path) control over local peasants and its alliance with drug traffickers were, until late 1993, such major obstacles that both the Peruvian military and U.S. drug control efforts found them difficult to overcome. Even after much of the Sendero's senior leadership was finally eliminated, the remnants continue to force drug control officers into "armed secure bases" in the Upper Huallaga Valley.29
Herbicidal eradication techniques have proven to be more efficient and effective. This is precisely why most Latin American governments have been reluctant to use them.
If vast areas of coca were to be quickly eradicated, it would create significant negative impacts on the economy, not to mention the popularity of many fledging Latin American democratic governments.
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In Bolivia and Peru, coca production has assumed considerable cultural and political significance. Use of the coca leaf has been legal for centuries in both countries to alleviate fatigue and pain and to curb the affects of high altitude.
In both countries the illicit-drug industry is politically connected from the bottom up. In Peru hundreds of coca farmers are represented by a national labor federation which is in turn connected to the rural elites and urban organizers. Peruvian officials fear that forced eradication will radicalize peasants and lead to armed conflict between eradication teams and farmers. Peruvian rural elites, particularly ranchers, farmers and merchants whose wealth and income are derived primarily from sugar cane, cotton, soy-sugar and rice mills, control much of the country's capacity to manufacture and distribute cocaine base.
In Bolivia, coca cultivation and trade is even more socially and politically intertwined. Five peasant federations account for all but a small portion of coca production. They act similar to small governments and are the most powerful political pressure groups in the country. 30 The upper class, political groups and labor unions have been very effective in blocking crop eradication agreements made between the United
States and the government of Bolivia.
Voluntary eradication programs have been equally unsuccessful. In Bolivia, the U.S. will compensate peasants $2000 per hectare for land removed from coca production. (1) Introducing replacement crops. When combined with the other elements described below, some crops have shown promise. In the Chapare, black pepper, pineapple and bananas have at times been able to compete with the profits of coca. In many cases farmers had to be convinced to relocate to more fertile areas that could support legal crops.
(2) Developing markets for legal produce. The goal here is to reduce the transport costs to markets. Some of the initiatives include growing crops that have a high value per pound, building or upgrading roads and bridges, constructing packing sheds and storage facilities, and providing trucks to haul produce to major markets at a lower price than is charged by commercial truckers. The lack of cooperation between Latin American countries and concerns over protection of their national sovereignty demonstrate that many of these nations do not consider the cultivation, production, and trafficking of illegal drugs a serious threat to their national security. They believe that the drug problem is caused by the United States and should be solved in the United States, not inside their own countries. Source country strategies should be focused on "Nation Building" programs designed to enhance the democratic process and economic growth tailored to each country's particular needs. President Clinton has acknowledged the importance of this by directing that more emphasis be placed on source countries, focusing on programs that 14 promote alternative development, dismantling trafficking organizations, and interdiction. 3 However, international programs comprise only 3 percent of the total U.S.
government drug control budget in FY 1997, of which only a very small portion is directed toward alternative development. 3 9 We need to insure that the priority of limited financial resources are put more toward economic development and less toward the traditional supply side solutions of eradication and interdiction. It is critical that we work to foster an economic and political base that will eventually allow source countries to sustain a greater share of the effort.
INTERDICTION: THE DEPARTURE ZONE
Compared to eradication, interdiction has less of a political and socioeconomic impact. Interdiction is focused on processors and traffickers who are considered criminals. This contrasts with eradication, in which the farmer is regarded as a helpless victim of the drug industry that must be helped and not punished. Interdiction is directed at cocaine which is acknowledged throughout Latin America to be an illegal product.
Eradication is directed at coca, which over the centuries has gained significant cultural importance to large populations of Latin America.
Interdiction of illegal drugs starts in the source country through efforts to locate and destroy refining laboratories, and to track and interdict shipments into and out of departure zones. According to the economic theory of source country interdiction, if the processing plants and refining laboratories are destroyed and traffickers caught and jailed, local demand for coca leaves will decline as will prices paid to the farmer. There have been few successful interdiction operations, all have been limited in impacting coca leaf prices. One example is Operation Blast Furnace, in 1986, which used a series of military raids against Bolivian cocaine laboratories and airstrips causing a collapse in coca leaf prices from an average of $2.30 per kilogram to 30 cents per kilogram. 40 The effects of Operation Blast Furnace were fleeting in nature. Farmers were not thwarted from growing coca and prices recovered six months later. The operation had very little, if any effect, on street prices in the United States.
Source country interdiction has failed for a variety of reasons: First, it affects short-term prices, but has not been able to change the farmer's expectation of prices that will prevail over the long term.
Second, traffickers and farmers are creative at finding new ways around restrictions. When flights out of the Chapare are interdicted, traffickers take the product out by road, trails or by boat across the borders of Argentina, Chile or Brazil. When controls are placed on chemicals used in processing, traffickers use recycling techniques.
When prices drop, farmers tend to cut their overhead by using family members to harvest the coca and rely on legal crops to sustain themselves until coca prices rise again. Some farmers are now capable of processing coca themselves when traffickers' laboratories are interdicted.
Third, the demand for cocaine is so great and the illicit industry so well established that it would take a massive, internationally coordinated interdiction effort, coupled with viable economic alternatives in order to have any long term affect. Effectively interdicting the flow of cocaine into the United States in order to raise street prices is exceedingly difficult not only because of the large area that must be covered, but also because U.S. consumption seems to be relatively small as compared to the huge amounts of cocaine that are smuggled into the United States. While it is impossible to accurately measure the total amount of cocaine that is actually smuggled into the U.S., we do know that in 1994 authorities seized more than 220 metric tons of cocaine in transit to the United States or at the U.S. border. The U.S. annual cocaine habit is equal to 300 metric tons and could be carried by three Boeing 747 cargo planes or 12 trailer trucks.4 Considering this and the enormous area to cover, it is a wonder that interdiction works at all.
Some observers and analysts believe these seizures indicate successful interdiction; they contend that we are getting our money's worth. But taking the seizure figures at face value is to take them out of context, for what the seizure data fail to convey is how much cocaine actually gets into the United States. There is absolutely no evidence that suggests interdiction has created long term shortages and prevented demand from being met.
Our National Drug Control Strategy highlights that interdiction is a visible sign of our Nation's commitment to fight drugs, symbolic of our national will and real value as a deterrent raising the perceived risks faced by traffickers. It states six reasons why interdiction must remain an important component of the drug strategy:
1. "Interdiction results in drug seizures which reduce the amount of cocaine available internationally to supply the U.S. markets." The data previously presented shows that the demand is being met and our current methods of interdiction have had very little impact.
2. "Interdiction disrupts the production and distribution pipeline, making smuggling operations more risky and costly, cutting profits of established traffickers, and deterring potential traffickers from entering the market." The data previously presented shows that prices have fallen, profits are still acceptable and risk is relative depending on the individual and the value of the profit to be made.
3. "Interdiction helps law enforcement agencies attack narcotics trafficking organizations, arrest traffickers and seize assets." This statement is true but so far our efforts have not been good enough to have made an impact.
4. "Interdiction efforts provide critical intelligence." Intelligence collection is probably the most important and cost effective aspect of interdiction in order to catch and prosecute drug lords and narco-terrorists. However, intelligence gathering is usually a by-product of our current interdiction techniques of search, arrest and seizure.
5. "Interdiction disrupts trafficking patterns, making work of smuggling, money, drugs and precursor/essential chemicals more difficult." This is a true statement, but the production and availability of illicit drugs are increasing or holding steady. 
CONCLUSION
Overwhelming evidence indicates that our source country and interdiction strategies have not been effective. The cocaine industry can be viewed in traditional business terms: it enjoys access to low-cost resources (land and labor), and has short recovery times between policy implementation, (interdiction and eradication), and industry response. The economics of the drug industry require that a massive interdiction must take place before retail prices are significantly affected. Even then, the shortage will last for only a short period of time. In the long run, interdiction in the Departure and
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Transit Zones -especially by the U.S. military -will work no better to curb cocaine production and use than the source country policy of eradication.
A supply side strategy which fails to incorporate a source country's political and socio-economic structure will be doomed to the same frustrating results of the past decade. If the United States intends to discourage Latin American countries from cultivating drug producing crops and to encourage their cooperation in eradication programs, we must focus more on economic solutions rather than on traditional methods of eradication and interdiction. Even successful eradication programs cannot prevent peasants from recultivating unless they can turn to viable crops, gain access to markets and sell their produce for a profit. U.S.-sponsored eradication efforts should only be used in conjunction with long term economic development plans that are underwritten by the source country governments.
We must continue to build international agreements between the industrialized nations and Latin American countries in order to commit more resources toward multinational operations, to include tighter controls over money laundering and sharing of information and intelligence. Use of established international organizations such as the United Nations, Organization of American States, and the Inter-American Defense
Board can help the United States gain the international cooperation that is critical for our strategy to be effective.
There is now enough historical evidence to justify a shift of resources away from our supply oriented strategy toward other programs that show promise in reducing the cultivation, production, and trafficking of illegal drugs. However, the Clinton Administration's 1997 budget is still heavily weighted toward the traditional supply strategy that has been a legacy of failure. 4 9 Interdiction, eradication, and law enforcement, to include DOD support, represent 67 percent of the total drug control budget, an increase of 2% over 1996.50 International and alternative development programs account for less than 3% of the 1997 budget.51
Our current strategy is costly and inefficient. A recent study estimated that it would take 800 million dollars in supply reduction programs (interdiction and source country policies) to achieve a one percent reduction in cocaine consumption. The same results could be achieved by allocating 34 million dollars to demand reduction programs such as treatment and prevention. 52 Studies have yet to be done to compare the cost effectiveness of economic and alternative development programs as they relate to the reduction of cocaine consumption.
While there is no guaranteed solution to the drug problem in America, we can at least look at what has failed in the past and adjust. Only a real shift in resources toward priorities at home and abroad will put us on the road to recovery.
